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Diasporas building peace: reflections from the 
experience of Middle Eastern diasporas
Bahar Baser and Mari Toivanen
In almost every conflict around the world today, diasporas are identified as critical stakeholders 
(Geukjian 2014; Probst 2016: 2; Shain 2002). Indeed, the growing importance of diasporas in
contemporary world politics has brought more intense scrutiny to them. A bourgeoning literature has
thus arisen on their role as contributors to (and spoilers of) peace processes, as agents for post-conflict
development, and as bridges between third parties and homeland political actors (Baser and Swain 2008;
Cohen 2008; Pande 2017: 5). Although until recently diasporas were portrayed as victims of conflicts
and/or as passive recipients of the politics of both homeland and host country, they are now more and
more also seen as purposive and capable agents. This reality is being increasingly recognized by
academics, as well as by NGOs and key political actors in both the homeland and host countries. As
Cohen (1996) rightly put it almost two decades ago, yesterday’s victims have become today’s vocal
challengers to existing political mechanisms and processes, both at home and abroad. If migration and
refugees remain highly charged and visible topics in contemporary politics, diasporas will also continue
to receive ample scrutiny and will surely attract greater attention in the future.
Diasporas from the Middle East
Diasporas from the Middle East were, globally speaking, the largest diasporic movements to form during
the twentieth century. Whereas earlier migration movements from the region were more closely linked
to outward labour migration, in the late twentieth century humanitarian migration resulting from inter-
and intra-ethnic conflicts rose in importance. In scope and intensity, the migrations from Turkey,
Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Iran and Palestine (among other countries), have been tightly linked to societal and
political developments within these countries. Middle Eastern diasporas today therefore constitute
something of an amalgam of both labour (voluntary) and conflict-generated (largely involuntary) waves
of historical migration. This has meant that, across the globe, the engagement of diasporic communities
with homeland affairs has been neither homogenous nor straightforward. The ‘politicized ethnic
identities’ (Wald 2009: 1304) of those in the diaspora whose migration have been conflict generated,
have tended to sustain loyalties to the homeland. Establishing mature organizations and actively
transmitting identities, traumas and experiences from generation to generation has allowed diasporas to
have a range of capacities for mobilization and action. The environment of continual insecurity and crisis
in the Middle East also perpetuates these migration flows and, with each emerging new calamity or
conflict, the existing diasporas acquire new members.
An abundant body of empirical research shows how different diasporic groups from the Middle East
participate in peace-making efforts in their conflict-ridden home countries. The types of Middle Eastern
diasporic participation on which case studies have been based include establishing advocacy networks
(Mavroudi 2008), lobbying policy makers in the host state (Baser 2015; Toivanen 2014), participating
politically through external voting (Tabar 2014), taking part in conflict resolution (Geukjian 2014), 
investing and providing development support (Brinkerhoff 2008), and supporting reconciliation and
justice-seeking endeavours (Bamyeh 2007). Mobilization has also occurred online, thanks to the new
communication technologies and easy access to homeland media outlets (Alinejad 2011; Ben-David
2012; Helland 2007). The most commonly studied cases are the Palestinian, Lebanese, Jewish, Kurdish
and Egyptian diasporas. Some, such as the Egyptian diaspora in the UK (Underhill 2016), have only 
recently mobilized following a crisis in the homeland. Others, due to statelessness and constant 
oppression – notably the Palestinian and Kurdish diasporas – have maintained consistent mobilization 
over time (Baser 2015; Mason 2007; Toivanen 2014). The Armenians of Lebanon (Geukjian 2014) and
the Coptic diaspora from Egypt (Yefet 2017) are also widely studied providing insights into diasporic
groups that are religious minorities in their respective homelands. The newly emerging Syrian diaspora
             
            
       
              
           
               
             
               
             
             
          
               
           
          
        
             
           
           
             
               
               
            
          
            
            
              
             
            
              
            
            
            
     
            
          
           
           
         
                
    
      
              
            
              
               
            
       
        
  
             
       
            
              
                
              
             
            
            
               
is also receiving a lot of attention in the literature, especially from NGOs and think-tanks offering 
humanitarian assistance in the region, for they see its members as providing a useful conduit to the local 
communities there (Svoboda and Pantuliano 2015).
Such examples demonstrate the multiple ways in which different diasporic groups and their members
participate in homeland affairs, as well as the internal heterogeneity of diasporas themselves (Van Hear
and Cohen 2016). They also speak volumes about the contradictory effects that diasporic activism can
have on perpetuating a conflict instead of providing a means for peace building. As Probst (2016: 2)
argues, ‘the role of diasporas is not unconditionally positive or negative’, for they have multifaceted roles
to play in conflict. The debate on whether diasporas are ‘peace-wreckers or peace-makers’ (Smith and
Stares 2007) has dominated discussions on the role of diasporas for the last decade. Most of the literature
has been based on case studies of a specific country and findings have been highly context-dependent. 
For instance, scholars studying security or terrorism have focused on how diasporas prolong conflicts by
giving material and non-material support to terrorist organizations, in the context of increasing suspicions 
about diasporic engagement. The dominant perspective has been that diasporas have been involved in
non-transparent actions that were potentially altering political situations in their homelands and that a 
better understanding of the mechanisms they were using to prolong conflicts while undermining the
surveillance mechanisms of the host countries was needed (Hoffman et al. 2007).
Scholars from a social movement background have underlined that diasporas mobilized similarly to
advocacy networks and that their actions could be better understood from a social movement perspective, 
with its focus on mobilizing resources and social capital (Biswas 2004). Another strand of research have
focused on the positive impact that diasporas can have on homeland conflicts and specifically highlighted
their role in post-conflict reconstruction and development, whether it be through investing in the
homeland economy or by acting as a third party between donours and homeland governments (Cochrane
et al. 2009; Kent 2006). The ongoing debates, despite multiple approaches, have all concluded that 
diasporas are multifaceted and not at all homogenous. Therefore, within a diasporic group, there could 
be multiple clusters of different ideological, religious, ethnic or economic backgrounds and with varying
agendas for the homeland and host country. For instance, McAuliffe (2007) clearly shows how first- and
second-generation members of the Iranian diaspora are divided across religious lines, even as both
maintain their transnational links with the theocratic Iranian state. The Alevite diaspora from Turkey has
also set up separate associations from those established by Sunni-Muslim groups coming from the same 
country (Sökefeld 2006). Moreover, a diasporic group can alter its strategy during a conflict – a stance
towards a homeland struggle is not static. Diasporic identities are fluid and so are their political aims and
goals (Smith and Stares 2007). 
All these points have left scholars pointing to the significant dilemma host countries face when
addressing the question of ‘how, when and who to engage’ among their local diasporas in conflict
resolution in their homelands. Since clearly ‘diasporas matter’, the questions that follow are ‘what
impact’ do they have and ‘under what conditions’? - questions that still remain to some extent 
unaddressed in the literature. Original case-study-based research offers the prospect of gaining
significant insight into these questions although the jury is still out on whether diaspora’s role in conflicts
is positive or not. 
What conditions the resolution and prolongation of conflict?
Not all diasporas from the Middle East wish to engage in homeland affairs (Asal and Ayres 2017). Those
that do adopt different means of exercising their influence in homeland and host country politics. 
Moreover, the overall impact will depend on the political and societal contexts of the homeland, as well
as of the host country, not to mention the diaspora’s ability and motivation for engagement. The political
opportunity structures in the sending and receiving countries, diplomatic relations between them and the
robustness of transnational channels (networks and institutional structures) are factors that influence a 
given diaspora’s impact on homeland peace-making or peace-wrecking (Baser 2015; Sökefeld 2006;
Yefet 2017). 
Acquiring an independent role as a political actor in peacebuilding necessitates as a first step a
political opportunity structure in the host country that facilitates diaspora lobbying, para-diplomacy and 
advocacy work towards host-state political actors (Baser 2015; Geukjian 2014). Even where the host
country is open to this kind of activism, diasporic groups may not be particularly successful. Yefet (2017:
1207) argues that although the Coptic diaspora in the USA has been successful in terms of lobbying
Congress and effectively raising White House awareness of the plight of the Copts, they have had little
influence on shifting US foreign policy towards Egypt in a direction that would favour their agenda. 
Extensive political opportunities in the host country have in this case been superseded by other factors 
that have limited the diaspora’s impact. The compatibility of the national interests of both homeland and
host country is thus a highly pertinent factor in the equation. Resource attributes – particularly levels of
         
              
               
          
                
          
              
             
     
           
            
            
              
        
            
                
             
          
   
          
                
         
              
            
          
               
            
             
           
               
             
           
    
         
         
              
              
             
            
 
                 
          
              
                 
          
             
            
           
            
              
                
         
              
             
               
      
               
           
            
education, integration and financial heft – are also major determinants of a diaspora’s success. For
instance, Skulte-Ouaiss and Tabar (2015: 160) have found that the presence of these resources has been
crucial to the ability of the Lebanese diaspora in Australia, Canada and the USA to affect homeland
affairs in Lebanon. Moreover, growing Islamophobia and securitization since 9/11 have placed
significant obstacles in the way of diasporic groups from the Middle East (Howell and Shryock 2003).
Often, discussions on terrorism dovetail with the migration issue and the question of refugees and 
diasporas (Schmid 2016). Where a diaspora is portrayed as sympathizing with groups listed on the US
and EU list of terrorist organisations, the prospect of being criminalized and having severe restrictions
on self-representation and activism/mobilization is ever-present. 
Also, the homeland–diaspora relations are not always rosy. When debates about homeland affairs 
between homeland political actors and diasporas erupt into conflict, the latter may find themselves in a
challenging situation. First, there may be a fundamental disconnect between local political actors and the
diaspora over expectations of how the latter will contribute, participate, and/or exercise influence in the
homeland. As Khachig Tölölyan notes in relation to the diaspora–homeland nexus in the Armenian case:
‘they want service and money from diasporans, not thoughts or opinions’ (cited in Shain 2002: 104).
Second, the homeland might consider the diaspora a threat to its own security or interests. The Kurdish
diaspora in Europe and elsewhere has often contested the Turkish state’s sovereignty from abroad,
resulting in considerable diplomatic tension between European countries and Turkey (Baser 2015;
Østergaard-Nielsen 2003).
As mentioned, diasporas are not merely victims of surrounding circumstances; they also exercise 
agency and make use of their capacities to shape and influence events proactively (Geukjian 2014). The
diaspora’s capacity and motivation to influence a homeland conflict (Freitas 2012: 5) is immensely 
important in terms of determining the scope of its actions. Some groups may have higher levels of
motivation but less capacity to influence peace outcomes, while others might proceed with caution
despite having significant resources at their disposal. Some might have adverse aspirations about the 
conflict yet lack the capacity to act as saboteurs, while in other cases the capability will be present but 
the group may remain indifferent. In many cases, the diaspora’s impact remains solely philanthropic
(Yefet 2016: 1210). More importantly, different political orientations, cross-cutting loyalties, as well as,
among other factors, ethnic and religious backgrounds, can cause diasporas to have divided interests
among themselves (Probst 2016: 6). The actions of their members are hindered by divisions that mirror
existing cleavages in the homeland, or emerge from newer rifts because of shifting conditions in the host
country. Developing projects for diasporic engagement will be complex for home and host countries, as
well as for third parties, unless these facts are considered.
Diasporic engagement in peacebuilding at various stages of a conflict
Literature on peace-building and conflict resolution in different states or regions that are politically 
unstable, and/or in the process of democratic transition is abundant (Cochrane et al. 2009). This research
shows that diasporic involvement is dependent on the stage of the conflict and the various other factors
mentioned above. As Bercovitch (2007) has noted, each phase of the conflict – from conflict prevention
to the post-conflict scenario – generates different diasporic behaviour offering varying options for
intervention. 
Diasporas can play versatile roles when there is an ongoing conflict in the homeland. They can lobby
host governments, push for economic sanctions and organize advocacy networks (Bercovitch 2007: 30).
Transnational space provides an excellent platform for diasporas from the Middle East – especially for
those who form a minority in the homeland – to mobilize and voice their demands without oppression or
fear of persecution. That is why Kurdish and Palestinian diasporas, as the two largest stateless nations of
the world, use this space to protest and contest the sovereignty of their respective states, which have
undermined their identity, culture and even their right to exist. While the conflict endures in their
homeland, they continue to lobby supranational institutions as well as host states to put leverage on their
oppressors. For instance, Arab states encourage Arab diasporas all around the world to boycott Israeli
products (Bercovitch 2007: 31). The Kurdish diaspora, on the other hand, puts a lot of pressure on the 
European Union to admonish Turkey for its human rights violations against the Kurds (Baser 2015).
Diasporans can also organize media campaigns, massive demonstrations, petitions and awareness
drives to make their voices heard during a conflict. The Kurdish diaspora from Iraq organized widespread
marches and hunger strikes during Saddam Hussein’s Anfal campaign, which killed thousands of Kurds
in the late 1980s. Moreover, during the invasion of Iraq, the Iraqi Kurdish diaspora was highly supportive
of US involvement and even provided political consultancy and intelligence to foreign governments
during the war. However, the general Iraqi diaspora’s reaction to the US invasion was much less focused
and homogenous. Diasporans also quickly react to critical junctures in their homelands. During the so-
called ‘Arab Spring’ they played an especially vital role in transmitting messages from the homeland to 
              
               
   
         
           
             
            
            
           
           
               
            
            
           
             
           
          
     
            
          
              
             
        
            
              
          
       
             
             
             
  
      
        
       
             
               
            
              
          
              
        
         
               
             
            
         
               
    
            
             
            
            
                  
           
               
                
     
          
          
              
a wider Western audience (Breuer et al. 2015). During the Gezi protests, the Turkish diaspora also reacted
immediately and created awareness in Europe, the USA and Australia when the media in Turkey were
heavily censured (Baser 2015).
Advocacy and lobbying are among the activities that diasporic groups can undertake during an
ongoing conflict, for their efforts during this phase are more visible and detectable. However, when it 
comes to the actual peace process, a diaspora’s engagement is more limited and its potential to make an
impact on the ongoing process is minimal. One reason for this is that most peace processes are private
and take place behind closed doors. This secrecy isolates third parties, including diasporas, unless the
talks are explicitly designed to encompass them. Although they are designated actors for advocacy, their
agency might be undermined during peace processes. Their inclusion/exclusion also depends on how
crucial they are to the negotiating parties and how much leverage they have on each actor involved in
the process. Diasporas can, in short, sabotage or accelerate a peace process depending on their own
agenda and how compatible it is with that of the homeland actors. Moreover, diasporic inclusion in these
processes prompts a question about representation. Diasporas are not elected by any constituency; they
are merely mobilized (and often highly vocal) people claiming to represent a certain group. Therefore,
their inclusion complicates the process. For instance, as Gertheiss (2015) has noted, both Jewish and 
Palestinian diasporas have had hawkish and dovish factions, each with varying agendas for a potential
solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.
Diasporans are also becoming influential actors in transitional justice mechanisms, for more and more
state actors are perceiving them as stakeholders in that process. They participate in truth commissions,
testify in courts and support homeland actors and third parties in bringing human rights violations to the
fore. Moreover, where transitional justice does not formally take place, diasporas invest in
commemoration events that not only strengthen their ties to their kin in the homeland but also keep 
traumatic events on the agenda. For instance, the Iraqi Kurdish diaspora has been investing significant
amounts of money and energy into achieving recognition of Saddam Hussein’s Anfal campaign as a 
genocide in various European parliaments. With the help of the Kurdistan Regional Government’s
official representations in European countries they have been successful in this in Sweden, Norway and 
the UK (Baser & Toivanen 2017). Assyrians from Turkey have also lobbied the Swedish parliament to
recognize the atrocities perpetrated against them during the Ottoman era as genocide. Kurds from Turkey
also demand transitional justice and truth commissions in Turkey and constantly feed information to the 
local Kurds about other truth commissions around the world.
Scholars have provided rich documentation on how Middle Eastern diasporas, among others,
contribute to homeland development via economic and social remittances, long-distance political
participation and return migration. For instance, in 2016 the economic remittances that migrants from
developing countries sent back home amounted to three times the official aid flows and constituted more
than 10 per cent of GDP in 25 developing countries (World Bank 2016). Economic remittances to the
Middle East have been growing steadily, with Egypt becoming the top recipient in 2015 (World Bank
2016). An IOM (2010) study found that the Egyptian diaspora’s economic remittances are employed not
only to meet the daily household expenses of migrants’ families back home but also for investment 
purposes. Studies such as Tabar’s (2014) research on the Lebanese diaspora in Australia show the impact
and relevance of long-distance voting to homeland political processes in post-conflict situations. On the
other hand, diasporans returning after conflicts has previously been considered a precondition for post-
conflict reconstruction. However, in a case study on Iraqi Kurds in Sweden, Emanuelsson (2008) shows
that transfer of knowledge and expertise can also take place via partial return or transnationally without 
necessitating a permanent return. The development of digital technologies in the form of ‘mobile money’
accounts and electronic money transfers via smart phones enable low-cost and cross-border money 
transfers to be made to sending regions that can then support post-conflict reconstruction processes and
development initiatives back home.
Studies have also shown that there is a continuum between peace-building and development activities
once the homeland conflict has subsided (Horst et al. 2010). The engagement of diasporas in
development activities can, in a post-conflict situation, become part of the reconstruction process.
However, what shapes diasporic engagement in post-conflict reconstruction is the way the conflict has
ended. For instance, Van Hear and Cohen (2016: 4) list three possible outcomes of a conflict that shape
such activities: (1) stalemate (Afghanistan and Palestine); (2) negotiated peace and settlement (Lebanon);
and (3) military victory by one side (Iraq). The result of the conflict shapes not only the motivations of
diasporans to engage in post-conflict reconstruction – for instance, if they are on the losing side – but
also their possibilities of doing so. 
One factor to hinder diasporic engagement in homeland development and post-conflict reconstruction
through official channels can be a lack of trust towards local institutions and financial instruments. 
Paasche’s (2016) study on Kurdish return migrants in Iraqi Kurdistan, and their experiences of corruption 
             
            
              
         
             
          
 
          
            
             
        
               
  
            
             
              
              
               
              
           
          
                  
    
               
                
              
            
               
            
                
             
   
 
             
 
             
       
              
      
                
          
          
          
         
               
       
             
       
                 
            
              
       
                 
      
                 
           
    
in the context of post-conflict peace, is an illustration of this point. A recent report by Malouche et al. 
(2016) shows that the members of Middle Eastern diasporas are more attached to their cities and 
immediate networks of family and relatives than to their countries of origin. The transfer of political, 
economic and social remittances often takes place via these more informal channels and personal
networks. As a general trend, the study also shows that Middle Eastern diasporas are motivated to
contribute towards their homeland development, regardless of their country of residence.
Conclusion
Diasporas are contemporary non-state actors whose importance has been acknowledged but whose
influence has yet to be fully understood. They are stakeholders in virtually every conflict today and there
is growing interest in exploring the intricacies of engaging them in conflict resolution. As they are not 
homogenous, their size, motivation and capacity differ and their networks are sometimes not evident; 
they constitute a complex partner for the home and host countries that seek to engage them in such
processes.
Diasporas from the Middle East are a particularly challenging for policy-makers and third parties to
discern. They usually come from countries in conflict and most of these groups are abroad because they
are being oppressed or undermined by their respective states. In addition, they often actively contest the
sovereignties and political legitimacy of these states at home and abroad. There are also groups in the
diaspora that support the policies of their home state and this contributes to the multilayered nature of
their interests and agendas. Although we have provided plenty of examples above, yet it is difficult to
talk about a monolithic ‘Middle Eastern experience’, for each diaspora’s capacity to exercise impact in
homeland varies according to the opportunity structures, foreign policies and other political, economic 
and social factors in host states. Also, the openness of a home state to its diaspora’s influence makes each
diaspora’s manoeuvring space very diverse.
What is demonstrated here is that diasporas from the Middle East continue to show interest in their
homeland; they engage in various repertoires of action to influence policy making in both home and host
country and they will continue to do so – perhaps with even more rigour as their agency keeps getting 
recognized by political actors. The importance of Middle Eastern diasporas in homeland peace-building 
and conflict resolution will only increase with the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ and their rising numbers in
Western societies. However, with the growth of Islamophobia, xenophobia and the general rise of right-
wing parties in the host countries they might also face more suspicion and more limited opportunities to
intervene. Given such pressing conditions at home and abroad, diasporas are yet to carve out their spaces 
of representation.
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